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The neoliberal academic: illustrating shifting academic norms in an age of 
hyper-performativity   
 
Bruce Macfarlane 




Neoliberalism is invariably presented as a governing regime of market and 
competition-based systems rather than as a set of migratory practices that are re-
setting the ethical standards of the academy. This paper seeks to explore the way in 
which neoliberalism is shifting the prevailing values of the academy by drawing on 
two illustrations: the death of disinterestedness and the obfuscation of authorship. 
While there was never a golden age when norms such as disinterestedness were 
universally practiced they represented widely accepted aesthetic ideals associated 
with academic life. By contrast, neoliberal academics embrace a new set of 
assumptions and norms that stand in sharp relief to many of the values that were 
previously espoused. Practices that might have been regarded as ethically dubious by 
earlier generations of academics, such as grantsmanship, self-justificatory expressions 
of interestedness and tangential claims to authorship, are now regarded as legitimate 









The ways in which ethics plays out within the academy is almost invariably 
represented in dramatic terms through highly publicized plagiarism cases or the 
falsification of data (Nurunnabi and Hossain, 2019). This is the default definition of 
‘academic integrity’. It is misrepresented as merely avoiding ethical failure, like 
plagiarism or falsification of data, rather than as achieving ethical excellence. 
However, it is important to understand the ethical norms of the academy in more 
subtly shifting terms beyond the ubiquitous mantra of research misconduct 
(Falsification, Fabrication and Plagiarism or FFP). Instead, the nature of academic 
norms needs to be understood as part of a changing set of professional behaviors and 
assumptions linked to the effects of post-modernism, neoliberalism and 
performativity. It is important to reflect on the changing parameters in which 
academic norms are modulated or blurred ‘to accommodate contemporary 
occupational demands’ (Chubb and Watermeyer, 2017:2361-2362).  
In understanding the shifting landscape of ethical norms within the academy, 
neoliberalism operates, not just as a governing regime of market and competition-
based systems but as a ‘set of migratory practices’ (Ong, 2007:4). This is about 
neoliberalism with a small ‘n’ as opposed to neoliberalism with a big ‘N’. Hence, 
neoliberalism is about more than governmentality since it is also about the alterations 
to the way in which the free subjects of neoliberalism behave (Ong, 2007:4). Many of 
its assumptions are now an established part of academic life. They have been learned, 
practiced and already passed down to another generation: the importance of obtaining 
research grants from prestigious funding organisations; pursuing a research agenda 
largely shaped by such organisations and universities keen to orientate the academics 
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towards meeting society’s so-called ‘grand challenges’; and entering into the personal 
marketing and self-promotion of academic work to prove the ‘impact’ of one’s 
scholarship are notable examples. These practices, and the values that underpin them 
aid what Oleksiyenko (2018:195) has described as ‘the neoliberal advancement of 
forcefully self-promoting scientists’. These are the beneficiaries of neoliberalism 
rather than the victims that are normally portrayed.  
In a post-welfare society the emphasis on individual responsibility, sometimes termed 
‘responsibilisation’ (Rose, 1990), has led to rising expectations that citizens will self-
manage and care for themselves on the basis that this enhances their individual 
autonomy. In health policy individuals are expected to manage their own illnesses 
whilst in university life there is now a widespread acceptance that to be a ‘good’ 
academic there is a responsibility to be a productive worker who publishes high 
quality scholarship, obtains research grants and achieves teaching ‘excellence’. 
Responsibilisation further means that institutions encourage academics to understand 
these performative expectations as a duty in order to serve and protect the university 
in an increasingly competitive environment for student recruitment and government 
funding.  
Post-modernism manifests itself in the rejection of the modernist science project and 
the de-legitimisation of the pursuit of truth as the aim of academic endeavour. It 
promotes what Barnett (1990) has referred to as epistemological undermining of the 
higher education curriculum. The pursuit of truth and the importance of maintaining 
an intellectual disinterestedness in order to totalize and universalize is now regarded 
as hopelessly naïve, failing to acknowledge the hierarchies and power structures that 
exclude knowledge in modern cultures. The focus on de-colonisation of the 
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curriculum is perhaps one of the most notable illustrations of the epistemological 
undermining of the modernist curriculum now widely regarded by critics as too white 
and too Western (e.g. Connell, 2007). 
Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes between three types of capital: economic, social and 
cultural and later added a fourth, symbolic capital. In academic life these may be 
thought of as academic capitalism through control over economic resources such as 
research grants, income from consultancy or possibly an invention, and the physical 
infrastructure of a room, building or laboratory (economic capital); academic 
cronyism via formal and informal membership of prestigious academic networks and 
societies that provide connections and sources of influence (social capital); academic 
in-breeding leading to tacit knowledge of the conventions associated with how to 
behave and gain advantages in the academic milieu (cultural capital); and, finally,  
academic prestige through forms of formal recognition, such as professorships or 
prizes for academic achievement the most visible of which are Nobel prizes and 
Fields Medals (symbolic capital). Whilst these forms of capital have always existed in 
academic life, performative pressures within the global academy have extended and 
deepened their corrupting effects in recent years.  
 
This paper will present illustrations of the way ethical norms have migrated, re-
shaped by the forces of neoliberalism and post-modernism. In so doing it will 
demonstrate how fundamental values in academic life, such as disinterestedness, have 
been displaced by new ethical norms. These new norms provide the basis for 
contemporary academic prestige that have heightened the importance of ‘the many 
outcomes and outputs of university activity’ (Blackmore, 2016:153), such as 
publications and research grants. The measurement of this hyper-performativity has 
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resulted in the emergence of the neoliberal academic. It is a system that embraces the 
legitimacy of competition and the assumptions of the market in the continuous 
evaluation of the hyper-productive academic. 
 
The death of disinterestedness  
The academic norm of disinterestedness refers to the pursuit of truth uninhibited by 
bias or presupposition. As such it has been perhaps the cornerstone ethical norm in 
academic life since the enlightenment. Yet, disinterestedness is now increasingly 
undermined by the twin forces of post-modernism and neoliberalism. The pursuit of 
the truth as a modernist goal has been replaced with increased productivity to create 
many versions of the truth, each with an equal claim to validity. A detailed 
explanation of disinterestedness, drawing on the liberal tradition of higher education, 
is offered by Moberly (1949:63-64):  
 
the academic thinker must have a completely open field and he should 
approach it with a mind free from antecedent bias or presupposition. For him 
all questions are open, all assumptions tentative, all conclusions provisional. 
There is no fixed framework of thought within which he must operate, no 
authoritative premises which must be the starting point of his reasoning and 
which it would be impious to question. He may and must follow the argument 
whithersoever it leads.  
 
Hence, disinterestedness is tightly linked to the importance of critical thinking in 
higher education in the sense of a continuous questioning of all claims to knowledge. 
Disinterestedness implies not just intellectual independence but an unyielding, almost 
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brutal, honesty about one’s own methods, theories and findings. It is about self-denial, 
the suppression of the ego for the good of serving science as a community. 
 
Disinterestedness is probably most closely associated with the work of Robert Merton 
(1942) as expressed via the ‘D’ in his well-known C.U.D.O.S. acronymi. There is a 
long history of discussing disinterestedness in the literature on university and 
intellectual life variously (and synonymously) represented as a value, a virtue or a 
norm. It has an important place in European intellectual history and is represented in 
the work of influential philosophical figures such Kant, Schopenhauer and Popper. 
Flexner (1930: 223) refers to ‘scholarship and science in the most disinterested form’ 
as taking place in English universities and in antedating their establishment.  Matthew 
Arnold was influential in arguing that disinterestedness was one of the most important 
intellectual virtues which he described himself as ‘self-annulment’ (Arnold, 1993: 
144), an expression of Victorian high culture. In the nineteenth century, much 
academic and scientific work took place outside of the universities, indicative of the 
way the values of science or academe were shaped without the university and 
arguably perverted by the university’s much later, and belated, interest in research 
promoted by the pragmatic concerns of government funding.  
 
At this time the threat to disinterestedness was seen as emanating from the established 
Church as the main sponsor of university education rather than increasing interference 
or direction of science policy from government or business sponsorship as it might be 
perceived today. Writing in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, Philip 
Hamerton declared that disinterestedness was the most essential of the moral virtues 
to an intellectual life (Hamerton, 1910:62). Hamerton argued that the thinking of 
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scholars ‘can never be disinterested so long as their ruling motive is devotion to the 
interests of their Church.’ (Hamerton, 1910: 63-64). Max Weber (1973:17) rails 
against the way that ‘ecclesiastical acceptability’ (Weber, 1973:17) places limits on 
academic freedom in German universities and is a stern critic of the appointment of 
professors according to the criteria of religious adherence at the University of 
Strassburg in 1901 (Weber, 1973: 14). 
 
Disinterestedness is about a rejection of subjective self-interest and a desire for an 
aesthetic and highly disciplined form of intellectual honesty. Yet, precisely the 
antithesis of this norm, represented by both interestedness and grantsmanship, has 
largely replaced disinterestedness as a modern academic virtue. Interestedness has 
come to the fore through an increasingly self-conscious ‘identity insiderism’ (Merton, 
1972:103). Here, the legitimacy of the researcher is established not by their claim to 
disinterestedness but precisely the opposite value: a deep and personal connection to 
the matter being investigated. This means that only female sociologists can 
understand the experience of women, ‘only black historians can truly understand 
black history’ (Merton, 1972:103) and only working class ethnographers can 
understand the experiences of the poor, and so on. Cousin (2010:9) has described this 
state of affairs as a ‘positional piety’ that now means that the moral authority of the 
researcher flows from their close affinity with the research subject (Cousin, 2010:9). 
This new form of confessional privilege has come to replace the notion of the moral 
authority of the researcher as stemming from their distance, objectivity and academic 
expertise. Positionality statements, as part of methodological sections of papers and 
theses, represent a defense of partiality in research. Rather than a weakness this is 
now seen as a positive strength. The introduction of confessional privilege is seen as 
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making the research in some sense more authentic and trustworthy. In this manner, 
interestedness has become a new orthodoxy in the social sciences. 
 
Grantsmanship, is another contemporary virtue that stands in polar opposite to 
disinterestedness. This is now essential for promotion to higher academic ranks, 
including full professor. ‘Get grants or perish’ is fast replacing ‘publish or perish’ as 
the key performance practice of the academy under pressure from senior managers 
and administrators who, in turn, are responding to the tight financial environment 
prevalent in many higher education systems (Musambira, et al, 2012). While such 
expectations have long applied to academics working in the natural sciences such 
pressure is now experienced across all disciplines, including the humanities and social 
sciences. Grantsmanship is known to have a number of effects including redirecting 
energy away from the pursuit of research through the time-consuming nature of 
applying for funds. It is also widely seen as encouraging conservative research and 
cronyism due to the concentration of funding in the hands of an elite (Berezin, 1998). 
Yet, despite these pernicious effects, grantsmanship is seen as a virtuous professional 
skill that academics need to learn in order to thrive (e.g. Gotley, 2000).  
The template for being a neoliberal academic is detailed by universities in the way in 
which they now define being ‘research-active’ academic. Such a status, essential to 
academic prestige and the maintenance of career prospects, is defined in terms of just 
three activities: producing ‘outputs’ (such as journal papers and books) judged to be 
of a high quality in national research evaluation exercises, the generation of research 
income external to the institution, and supervising doctoral students to completion. 
Universities, especially in Australia and the UK where performance management 
systems are advanced according to neoliberal principles, define research-active in 
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terms of these three activities (e.g. ACU, 2018; Griffith University, 2018). It is thus 
clear that grantsmanship is core to how research is now defined. Essentially such 
neoliberal definitions of research mean that without successful grantsmanship an 
academic no longer qualifies as ‘research-active’ regardless of their contribution to 
advancing knowledge in their field through publication.  
There has been a subtle but clear shift in the vocabulary used to describe research that 
is carried out by academics who are not in receipt of funding. Formerly such research 
was referred to through a positive lexicon of phrases such as ‘independent research’, 
‘pure research’ or ‘scholarly investigation’ indicating a form of research that ‘does 
not always lend itself to organized efforts and is refractory to direction from above.’ 
(Bush, 1945: 81). Jaspers (1959:55) used the term ‘intellectual research’ as a way of 
describing deep philosophical reflection in any field. Now such work is disparaged or 
othered via the use of a negative lexicon of terms such as ‘unfunded research’ or 
‘curiosity-driven research’. Carrying out such work is no longer seen as high status 
but as somehow inconsequential, trivial or self-indulgent since it is not generating 
research income, even though the majority of such funding fails to cover the costs 
associated with the time of the researcher and the facilities and resources they use. 
The attainment of funded research is now a core part of how academic prestige is 
perceived (Blackmore, 2016:32) something that is increasingly highlighted within the 
academic CV, transformed from a historical record into a tool for self-promotion in 
response to the forces of neoliberalism (Macfarlane, 2018). 
 
There was a long and slow struggle to promote the importance of research in the 
British university. In Truscot’s (1943) powerful critique he argued that ‘the life of a 
well-established, middle-aged professor in the Arts faculty of a modern university 
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can, if he likes to make it so, be one of the softest jobs to be found on the earth’s 
surface’ (1943: 71). Despite Truscot’s concern that research needed to be taken more 
seriously in British universities he agreed with Flexner’s critique (1930) that too 
much research that is undertaken is of a trivial nature or fails to place sufficient 
intellectual demands on the researcher. Truscot (1943:107-108) refers to the 
‘prostitution of research by the choice of unworthy subjects’ and the ‘the insistence of 
research of a trivial kind’. He quotes approvingly from Herrenden-Harker’s 
(1935:112) distinction between those that ‘grub for facts’ and ‘those who strive for 
enlightenment’ arguing that it is the latter who are the real researchers. This acerbic 
comment directed at what we might now call empirical research turns on its head how 
we perceive the contemporary prestige economy of academic life where funded 
empirical research is seen as higher in status to forms of research and scholarship that 
are ‘non-empirical’. It is an attitude echoed in the views of A.H. Haley (1957:142) 
with respect to the differences between British and American sociology during the 
1950s in which he contrasts the ‘more humanistic’ approach of the small pocket of 
British sociologists during this time with the ‘frantic empiricism’ of a much bigger 
community of scholars on the other side of the Atlantic. 
 
While it has been claimed that disinterestedness is a myth built in the nineteenth 
century on the enduring story of the publication of On the Origin of Species which 
was driven, at least in part, by Darwin’s moral passions (Harman, 2011), its enduring 
appearance in the history of science and academe suggests that it is an espoused value 
of hugely symbolic importance. This does not mean that disinterestedness has always 
been adhered to any more than the theory of just and unjust wars might imply that 
warfare has always been conducted according to just war principles. At the very least 
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it was a principle of academic life that was regularly asserted if not always practiced. 
However, critically, it was a principle that was widely perceived as a cornerstone of 
what it meant to be an academic, a position that is now rarely espoused.  
 
The obfuscation of authorship 
 
The death of disinterestedness has been accompanied by a rapid expansion in 
publication activity by academics. This has become an increasingly pragmatic 
necessity for career initiation let alone its further development. Such expectations 
though have a relatively recent history, particularly in a British context, but are now 
advanced in their implications for security of employment in academic life. The rise 
in publication productivity has been startling and cannot be assigned simply to greater 
opportunities to collaborate afforded by the development of the internet or advances 
in research methods. Publication is now seen as an essential activity for all academics 
rather than something that should be undertaken by those who have an exceptional 
talent, a view that was clearly expressed in the Robbins report (1963:184) when it 
stated that there were ‘many persons of first class ability, particularly in the 
humanities, who have never engaged in research in the narrow sense or felt any urge 
to publish, but whose breadth of culture, ripeness of judgement and wide-ranging 
intellectual curiosity are priceless assets…’. Publication was formerly seen as 
something for only the most talented, driven or simply vain individuals. Halsey and 
Trow (1971:328) regarded the desire for publication as class-related with academics 
from ‘lower-class backgrounds’ more eager to prove themselves in this way. This was 
not so much an expression of academic snobbery (Halsey was a sociologist with 
working-class roots) but a sociological speculation. ‘Research’ was understood in 
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much broader terms especially in the British liberal education tradition as about a 
critical engagement with the latest thinking in a field of study and its application via 
teaching in a manner that helped students to learn the ‘discipline of dissent’ (Ashby, 
1969:64).  
 
The spread of research evaluation exercises in contexts such as the UK, New Zealand 
and Hong Kong and cash-for-publication as a means of rewarding academics more 
directly in mainland - and South Africa has made publication an even higher stakes 
game. Narrow definitions of ‘research-active’ individually related to high quality 
publication, grant capture and doctoral completion rates is now being used to 
determine whether an academic can remain on an all round’ (i.e. teaching and 
research) contract. If an academic is perceived to be under-performing in any of these 
respects they face the possibility of being moved onto a ‘teaching-only’ contract as 
part of the growing periphery on contractually-inferior terms and conditions who 
work in higher education. These contractual changes have accelerated the division 
between ‘teaching only and research active staff’ (Oancea, 2019). The liberal 
definition of research has given way to one that is now based on production of 
publications, grants, and doctoral graduates. In the process this has transformed 
understanding of publication as an activity confined to the exceptionally talented – or 
possibly vainglorious – to one that is an essential baseline performance requirement.  
 
The increased publication productivity of academics in all disciplines means that 
authorship is now common to all. There have always been authorship abuses in 
academic life but the pressure to publish is now so great that many ethically dubious 
authorship practices have become firmly entrenched. This has been encouraged, at 
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least in part, by the importance now attached to bibliometric indicators to rank, recruit 
and increasingly promote academics. Co-authorship, always common in the natural 
and applied sciences, is now the norm in the humanities and social sciences 
(Macfarlane et. al., 2017). While co-authorship is often presented as an 
uncomplicated indicator of collaboration, there is an ugly side to the reality of 
attribution of authorship credit and the ordering of names. Who is named as an author, 
and whether they are listed as first author in some disciplines, is critical in shaping 
academic careers and hence the micro-politics of authorship is a minefield where 
hierarchical power can count for more than intellectual contribution due to the 
operation of a ‘gift economy’ (Macfarlane, 2017a:1194). A recent analysis of almost 
13,000 academic papers revealed that around 48 per cent of the co-authors listed did 
not satisfy the international standard for authorship laid down by the so-called 
Vancouver protocol since they did not play a role in the writing (Sauermann and 
Haeussler, 2017). Increasing competition and performance-based pressures were 
identified as the most popular explanation for rising levels of co-authorship among 
humanities and social science authors in an international survey ahead of other factors 
such as the growth of the internet (Macfarlane, et al, 2017). Being a person’s doctoral 
supervisor for a project can be (fallaciously) regarded by many academics as 
sufficient qualifications to become an author, regardless of their actual level of 
intellectual contribution to a publication (Macfarlane, et al, 2017). Naming the head 
of department, laboratory leader or grantholder is also a common but unethical 
practice (Shaw, 2014). This type of behaviour is the result, at least to some extent, of 
what Jaspers (1959:79) termed ‘intellectual industrialization’ as large teams come 




Gift authorship, the giving of undeserved credit, can be prompted by both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ motives. It is commonly associated with giving an authorship credit to a well-
known or influential person whose power and influence may be critical in gaining 
publication but it can also occur when more senior or influential academics decide to 
give an authorship credit to a junior or less experienced member of a research group 
in order to give them a career boost. This has been referred to as ‘gift ordering’ and is 
related to performance-based pressures that now shape the chances of junior 
academics in obtaining an appointment or gaining tenure (Macfarlane, 2017a). Such 
practices, while perhaps motivated by a concern for others without status or power in 
the academic hierarchy, still represent a deception and an obfuscation of true 
authorship contribution. Academic cronyism of this type has been further entrenched 
through the rise of co-authorship across all disciplinary fields, the exponential growth 
of references per paper, and the almost exclusive dependence on the PhD as the basis 
for an academic career. Government initiatives to reward research quality have also 
had corrupting effects, most notably the cash-for-publication policies in mainland 
China and South Africa.  
Referencing practices have also changed quite dramatically evidenced by the rise in 
the average number of references per academic paper over the last 40 years. In 1970 
this figure was just 8.40. Yet by 2005 the figure increased more than four fold to 
34.63 (Biglu, 2008). This trend is rarely remarked on in the context of the ethics of 
academic practice and there are a number of benign explanations that have been put 
forward to explain this trend such as the increasing use of teams of researchers, the 
expansion of the academic literature, more awareness of newly published research 
and so on. However, it is also in all probability linked to the effects of academic 
cronyism as well as citation counts have become ever more important in evidencing 
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the academic impact of publications through quantitative indicators such as Google 
Scholar and Scopus. The increased use of references per paper may further indicate 
more reliance on reference citations without reading the original publication, a 
practice that is essentially a form of soft plagiarism. Another possible explanation is 
that references per paper reflect excessive self-citation and game-playing tactics by 
authors citing papers previously published by the journal in which they are seeking to 
publish as a means of boosting their chances of acceptance. This is a practice that, at 
the same time, helps to raise the journal’s impact factor. 
There is now a growing emphasis on academics illustrating how their research has the 
potential to lead to change in society through so-called ‘impact’ statements contained 
within research grant applications. Both the Research Council UK and the Australian 
Research Council requires researchers to include statements in research applications 
indicating how their research will have such an effect labeled ‘Pathways to Impact’ 
and ‘Impact Statements’, respectively. Such is the importance now attached to 
obtaining research funds in a hyper-competitive academic environment that the 
writing of these statements is leading to ‘a moral permissiveness and/or elasticity in 
the authoring of PIS and a sense among funding applicants that to overstate impact 
claims was an inevitable means to an end in the acquisition of research funds’ (Chubb 
and Watermeyer, 2917: 2364). Exaggerating such claims is now seen as part of ‘the 
game’ and means that integrity issues with respect to authorship extend to the 
generation of research proposals even before any findings are generated or reported. 
Conclusion 
The death of disinterestedness and the obfuscation of authorship are illustrative of the 
ways in which neoliberalism is just as much about the practices of academics – 
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neoliberalism with a small ‘n’ as Ong (2007) has termed it – as the competitive and 
market-based frameworks established by governments and universities. These 
‘migratory practices’ (Ong, 2007:4) are clearly in evidence in the way in which the 
ethical norms of the academy have shifted. Practices that might have been regarded as 
ethically dubious by earlier generations of academics, such as grantsmanship or 
expressions of interestedness, are now regarded as legitimate and positive virtues. In 
the liberal tradition of British higher education a good deal of skepticism was 
associated with the pretentions of research: the perils of premature publication and as 
a blind alley that leads to the narrowing of intellectual interests and the investigation 
of trivial topics rather than broader philosophical reflection across a broader range of 
interconnected knowledge. In many respects, research was seen as a narrowing 
activity that threatened the goal of a liberal education exploring the connectiveness of 
knowledge. Publication is now regarded as an unqualified virtue as opposed to an 
activity potentially associated with closed minds, an insufficient commitment to 
teaching or those with narcissistic tendencies.  
Governments and universities now place a much stronger emphasis on the importance 
of ‘collaboration’ as a means of solving the world’s problems through research. This 
feeds into traditional, liberal notions of ‘the republic of science’ (Polanyi, 1962:1) 
whereby academic researchers co-operate in helping to solve the world’s problems. 
Michael Polanyi’s vision of the republic of science was one where ‘scientists, freely 
making their own choice of problems and pursuing them in the light of their own 
personal judgment are in fact cooperating as members of a closely knit organization.’ 
(Polanyi, 1962:1). However, the realpolitik of collaboration in a neoliberal higher 
education environment is quite different from Polanyi’s republic. Beyond the misty-
eyed idealism of Polanyi vision, collaboration is now promoted as a means of 
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increasing the productivity of academics to meet performance targets. Collaboration is 
also a benign label that covers up academic cronyism in the reinforcing the power of 
established and closed networks and parasitical authorship practices involving the 
exploitation of unacknowledged or maginalised junior researchers (Macfarlane, 
2017b). The problems which are deemed worthy of investigation are increasingly 
prescribed by government, funding bodies and universities through the identification 
of so-called ‘grand challenges’. These challenges or research themes, such as 
transformative technology, sustainability, cultural understanding and so on, appear 
uncontroversial at one level since they seek to represent a moral and social consensus. 
Yet, they to take ownership of the research agenda away from academics on the 
mistaken basis that governments and universities can solve the world’s problems by 
determining what is worth researching. Flexner (1930) argued persuasively that it was 
essential to preserve the independence and in a positive sense ‘irresponsibility’ of 
researchers as in solving one problem, advances in science will inevitably create new 
ones.  
Neoliberalism has had significant effects on both students and academic staff. As 
Archer (2008:282) has found some younger academic staff are ‘conflicted’ about the 
effects of neoliberalism accepting some changes but seeking to defy or resist other 
aspects. For members of this generation, though, the assumptions of neoliberalism 
have largely ‘infiltrated their bodies and minds’ and, as one of Archer’s respondent’s 
reported ‘can’t imagine doing it any other way’. As a result we are witnessing the 
inculcation of a number of ethical norms as neoliberal assumptions migrate from the 
governmental and institutional level to that of the individual academic. The 
responsibility to conduct and ‘produce’ research is no longer sufficient; responsibility 
is now framed in terms of grant capture that recovers the full economic costs incurred 
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in research work. Publications are not legitimate unless they are deemed of high 
quality and appear in a journal with a high impact factor. 
 
Humility in relation to research pretentions is no longer a virtue. The idea of 
authorship, once regarded as the preserve of the uniquely gifted or conceited, is now a 
standard part of the performance role of all those who wish to obtain or maintain their 
status as an academic. Since the rejection of the modernist project to establish 
universal knowledge claims, the purpose of publication has been altered from the 
vision of establishing ultimate truths to more limited and pragmatic epistemological 
and personal objectives.  The neoliberal academic will not openly question the virtue 
of grant capture, the legitimacy of the ‘grand challenges’ they bid for, or the 
questionable authorship practices that have now become commonplace in the hyper-
performative academy. They frame the basis of their professional performance and its 
evaluation and, as a result, they are required to embrace these norms as normal and 
legitimate. In so doing some may very well be entering into a form of ventriloquism: 
publicly espousing the values of the marketised academic whilst privately mocking 
such assumptions; adopting the persona of a ‘flexian’, adept at re-casting ideas in less 
intellectually challenging terms for policy audiences (Smith, 2012). It may also, sadly, 
be evidence of complicity with a competitive, ‘win-at-all-costs’ mentality that is 
becoming an all too evident feature of behaviour in academic life (Chubb and 
Watermeyer, 2017; Watermeyer and Tomlinson, 2018). 
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